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ABSTRACT
We analyze the impact of financial globalization on asset prices, investment and the
possibility of crashes driven by self-fulfilling expectations in emerging markets. In a two-country
model with one emerging market (intermediate income level) and one industrialized country (high
income level), we show that liberalization of capital flows increases asset prices, investment and
income in the emerging market. However, for intermediate levels of international financial
transaction costs, we find that pessimistic expectations can be self-fulfilling, leading to a financial
crash. The crash is accompanied by capital flight, a drop in income and investment below the
financial autarky level and more market incompleteness. We show that emerging markets are more
prone to financial crashes simply because they have a lower income level and not because of the
existence of market failures (moral hazard or credit constraints), bad monetary policies or exchange
rate regimes.
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When capital ￿ows more easily into and out of emerging markets, do these markets reap the bene￿ts
of increased investment and a better ability to diversity their risk? Or do they face an increased
likelihood of ￿nancial crash? The empirical literature seems to point towards the relevance of both
these outcomes. On the one hand, a number of papers in the ￿nance literature1 show that ￿nancial
opening in emerging markets leads to a decrease in the cost of equity capital and can have a positive
eﬀect on domestic investment. The macroeconomic literature2, using cross-country data, ￿nds more
tenuous evidence that ￿nancial opening contributes positively to long-run growth. On the other hand,
a voluminous literature on ￿nancial crisis emphasizes the risks of liberalization and the fragility of
emerging markets ￿nancial systems to capital mobility. Wyplosz (2001) ￿nds that external ￿nancial
liberalization is considerably more destabilizing in developing countries than in developed countries: it
generates a boom-bust cycle. Another strand of literature, surveyed by Aizenman (2002) 3 concludes
that liberalization of capital ￿ows has contributed to both banking and currency crises in emerging
markets. Kaminski and Schmukler (2001) show that stock markets become more volatile in the three
years following ￿nancial liberalization. They tend however to be more stable in the long run.
Figures 1 and 2 also suggest that ￿nancial openness alters the relation between the frequency of
￿nancial crashes and the level of income per capita. A crash is de￿n e da sam o n t h l yd r o pi nt h es t o c k
index (in dollars) larger than two standard deviations of the average monthly change. We plot on the
vertical axis the number of stock market crashes per year. Countries are ranked by log of GDP per
capita on the horizontal axis. We divided the sample in periods for which countries were ￿nancially
open and ￿nancially closed. Hence, among our 62 countries (34 emerging countries) 31 appear twice
as they changed status during the sample years. Appendix 1 provides more details on the data and
the way we de￿ne ￿nancial openness.
Figure 1 makes clear that for countries which have not opened to capital movements, no relation
exists between the frequency of crashes and the log of GDP per capita, whether Argentina, an obvious
outlier, is included or not. Statistically, a weakly negative but not signi￿cant relation exists. On the
other hand, ￿gure 2 illustrates that for countries which have opened to capital movements a negative
relation between the frequency of crashes and income per capita exists. This relation is statistically
signi￿cant. We have checked that this negative relative relation (and the absence of such relation for
closed economies) is robust to changes of the de￿nition of ￿nancial openess.
1See Bekaert and Harvey (2001), Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, (2001), Henry (2000), Chari and Henry (2002) and
de Jong and de Roon (2001).
2Edwards (2001) ￿nds that opening the capital account positively aﬀects growth only after the country has achieved a
certain degree of economic development. McKenzie (2001) concludes that restrictions on current account payments, but
not capital transactions, aﬀect growth negatively. Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) show that capital account
liberalization has a signi￿cant positive growth eﬀect contingent on the absence of macroeconomic imbalances.
3See for example, Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), Rossi (1999), Demig￿c-Kunt and Detragiache (1998),







































































































































































Figure 2: Financially open economies
2Except for the clear exception of Argentina (which has by far the highest number of crashes) and
to a lesser extent Chile, all emerging markets experience an increase in the frequency of crashes once
they liberalize. The table below gives the average annual frequency of crashes for developed (de￿ned
as countries with GDP per capita above South-Korea) and emerging countries.
Frequency of crashes developed emerging
closed countries 8.8% 25.1%
open countries 9.7% 61.6%
The table strongly suggests that opening to capital movements has a much more dramatic eﬀect on
the frequency of crashes in emerging markets than in developed ones, a point consistent with the
literature cited above on the eﬀect of capital opening on crises in emerging markets.
This paper presents a general framework in which the two eﬀects of ￿nancial globalization on
emerging markets- the decreased cost of capital and the increased frequency of crashes - can be
reconciled. We also make sense of the diﬀerential impact of ￿nancial globalization in emerging markets
and developed countries. In our model, reducing asset market segmentation between emerging markets
and developed countries increases asset prices, investment and income in the emerging market. Thus
￿nancial liberalization does perform its positive role of expanding diversi￿cation opportunities and
lowering the cost of investment in emerging markets. In certain circumstances, however, ￿nancial
liberalization can facilitate ￿nancial crashes. We show that emerging markets, if suﬃciently open
to capital movements, are more prone to ￿nancial crashes. This is due to the mere fact that their
income is lower than developed countries and not necessarily because of fundamental macro-economic
imbalances, a bad choice of exchange rate regime or the existence of market failures such as ￿moral
hazard￿, credit constraints or an ￿over-borrowing syndrome￿. The point we are making here is therefore
very general. In our model, the decision to invest by one agent in￿uences the cost of capital of other
investors through the impact of that decision on income and the price of assets. The type of market
failure we build upon can therefore best be described as a pecuniary externality.
We present a two-country model of the world economy (one generic emerging market and one
generic developed market). The emerging market and the developed economy diﬀer only in the
productivity levels of their labor. In both countries, domestic entrepreneurs decide whether or not
to invest in risky ￿xed-sized projects, sell shares of their projects on the stock exchange, and acquire
shares in other risky ventures developed at home or abroad.
When entrepreneurs expect that aggregate investment in their economy is large, they expect ag-
gregate income and demand for equity investment to be high as well. Because assets are imperfect
substitutes and transaction costs on international trade in assets give rise to a home bias in asset
holding, this in turn means that the expected price of their shares on the stock exchange will be high.
The high prospective prices give them an incentive to invest in a large number of risky projects. In
3such a case, facilitating capital ￿ows increases investment in the emerging market, because it reduces
its disadvantage of having a low income level that translates into low demand for domestic assets and
high cost of capital. This is the demand eﬀect that is identi￿ed in Martin and Rey (2001). This paper
discusses in detail the empirical evidence that supports the existence of such demand eﬀects on asset
prices. In particular, Schleifer (1986) disentangles information eﬀects from pure demand eﬀects and
shows that an exogenous demand shift leads to signi￿cantly higher asset prices.
The same logic may however go in the other direction: if entrepreneurs expect low levels of ag-
gregate investment, they also contemplate a low level of aggregate income and do not expect to be
able to raise capital at a good price. This deters them from developing risky projects. In such a case,
domestic investors turn to the developed country stock exchange to buy equity shares and there are
capital out￿ows from the emerging market to developed countries. This circular chain of causality
creates the possibility of multiple equilibria as long as investing in risky projects requires a ￿xed cost.
The "good equilibrium" is characterized by high asset prices, income and investment and in this case
￿nancial integration is bene￿cial to the emerging market on these three dimensions. We call a crash
the "bad equilibrium", characterized by a coordination failure resulting in low asset prices, income
and investment. The likelihood that it exists is higher at an intermediate degree of ￿nancial segmen-
tation. The reason why instability and crashes occur only for intermediate degrees of capital account
liberalizations in our model can be understood as follows. If ￿nancial markets are perfectly integrated,
international arbitrage ensures that asset prices are the same in the developed country and the emerg-
ing market. This rules out the possibility of multiple equilibria, since the price of equity shares in
the emerging market is pinned down by the price of capital worldwide and independent of domestic
expectations. Symmetrically, if ￿nancial asset markets are very segmented internationally, emerging
markets agents have no choice but to invest at home since capital out￿ows are heavily restricted. This
rules out capital ￿ight and multiple equilibria but leads to a suboptimal world allocation of resources
with lower equity prices (and therefore a higher cost of capital) in the emerging market compared to
the developed country. In the model, lower income countries are more prone to ￿nancial crashes. The
reason is that pessimistic expectations always have more dramatic consequences on the expected asset
prices in the lower income market.
In our model, asset prices and equity markets play a key role. The importance of stock markets
in emerging economies has increased substantially in the past decade, as documented by Claessens,
Klingebiel and Schmukler (2001). However, we believe the mechanism identi￿ed in this paper is
not speci￿c to the channel through which ￿rms ￿nance investment. Suppose ￿rms were to ￿nance
investment projects through bank loans. As long as banks do not consider these projects and the
associated bank loans to be perfect substitutes and that there exist transaction costs when banks
lend to foreign ￿rms, the real interest rate charged by banks could be diﬀerent across countries even
for projects with identical risk. If higher domestic expected investment and therefore income leads
4to a larger pool of saving, which because of imperfectly integrated ￿nancial markets, bene￿ts more
(through a lower interest rate) the domestic ￿rms, then the key ingredients behind the circular causality
mechanism that we analyze in this paper would also be present.
A closely related paper is Matsuyama (2001), who studies the impact of ￿nancial globalization on
inequality across countries when there is a borrowing constraint in domestic capital markets. Like
Matsuyama (2001), we ￿nd that in some cases, ￿nancial globalization leads to increased inequality
across nations. One advantage of our model is that we are able to analyze all the intermediate cases
of ￿nancial globalization (he contrasts autarky with free capital mobility). Also, we do not rely on
any speci￿c assumption regarding credit constraints on the domestic capital market. Instead we make
the simple and realistic assumption that labor is more productive in one country than in the other.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) analyze development patterns in an economy with risky indivisible
projects and show that free capital mobility may ￿rst lead to divergence with capital ￿o w i n gt ot h e
richer country and then a reversal of capital ￿ows with convergence at a faster rate than if the two
economies were closed. In their paper, as in Pagano (1993), multiple equilibria may exist because
assets are complements: the higher the number of assets, the more valuable existing assets become.
This is not the mechanism at work in our model as assets are substitutes and multiple equilibria arise
t h r o u g ha ni n c o m ee ﬀect.
Our paper is also related to the new trade and new economic geography literature, in particular
Krugman and Venables (1995) because our modelling of asset trade and of transaction costs has some
similarities with the modelling of trade in goods in this literature. They show that "catastrophic"
agglomeration of industries takes place for intermediate levels of trade costs because of cost and
demand linkages. The mechanisms and results we describe are however diﬀerent in particular because
of the intertemporal nature of our model. In new trade and new economic geography models, lower
transaction costs strengthen the "home market eﬀect" in the sense that the richer country specializes
more in the goods produced with increasing returns. In our model, lowering transaction costs on asset
trade has the opposite result in the equilibrium without a crash: it weakens the "home market eﬀect"
in the sense that it increases the asset price of the poorer country and leads to more investment in
that country. The reason is that lower transaction costs not only induce more portfolio diversi￿cation
but also more intertemporal trade which implies that the richer country demands more assets from
the poorer country.
More generally, our work is related both to the literature on ￿nancial integration (see Stulz 2001 for
as u r v e y )a n dt ot h el i t e r a t u r eo ns e l f - f u l ￿lling ￿nancial crises in emerging markets. Aghion, Bachetta
and Banerjee (2000) ￿nd that countries with intermediate levels of domestic ￿nancial development
and free capital movements are more prone to macroeconomic volatility. In contrast to their paper
and most of the existing literature, however, the vulnerability of emerging markets to ￿nancial crises
in our model does not result from strong assumptions distinguishing emerging markets from developed
5countries. In particular, we do not assume the existence of credit constraints on capital markets and
their implied balance sheets eﬀects (as in Diaz-Alejandro, 1985, Chang and Velasco, 1998, Meng and
Velasco, 1999, Krugman, 1999, Aghion, Bachetta, and Banerjee, 2000, Caballero and Krishnarmurthy,
1998 and 2000, Schneider and Tornell, 2000, Mendoza, 2001, Mendoza and Smith, 2001) or of moral
hazard (as in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebello, 1998, McKinnon and Pill, 1999 and Corsetti, Pesenti
and Roubini, 1999). Note ￿nally that in our model a ￿nancial crash can occur irrespective of the
exchange rate regime and without any currency mismatch.
Section 2 of the paper presents the model. Section 3 describes the properties of the equilibrium
when things go well. Section 4 investigates the conditions necessary for a ￿nancial crash to occur. Sec-
tion 5 and 6 analyze the impact of asymmetric external ￿nancial liberalization and domestic ￿nancial
liberalization respectively. Some welfare issues are considered in Section 7 and Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
There are two countries E (emerging) and I (industrialized) and two periods. In the beginning of
the ￿rst period, L identical agents endowed with one unit of labor work. They also decide whether and
how much to invest in risky projects which yield dividends in the second period. The good produced
in the ￿rst period has labor as its only input and is freely tradable on a competitive market. It serves
as the numeraire. The industrialized country has a higher marginal productivity of labor than the
emerging country, so that its wage rate wI, equal to marginal productivity, is higher than wE in the
emerging country. This is the only asymmetry between the two countries that we assume.
The cost for an individual of engaging in investment projects is F +f(zE), where zE is the number
of projects undertaken by a typical agent in the emerging market. We assume that these projects
are of ￿xed unit size. The cost function for projects is convex and has a quadratic functional form4:
f(zE)=1
2z2
E. A similar form applies to the industrialized country. In both locations, the marginal
cost of undertaking projects rises as an agent decides to invest in more projects. As these projects
are diﬀerent from each other (see below for their payoﬀ structure), the idea is that as investors do
more projects they lose the advantage of specialization. In addition, a ￿xed cost F has to be paid
to start investing in projects. We assume that this ￿xed cost is paid individually by each investor to
all other agents in the economy so that aggregate income is not aﬀected by the ￿xed cost5. This can
be interpreted for example as a ￿xed cost to become an entrepreneur such as a ￿at fee paid to the
government and redistributed at the end of the period.
The ￿rst period is without uncertainty. In the second period, there are N exogenous and equally
likely states of nature, and the realization is revealed at the beginning of that period. As in Acemoglu
and Zilliboti (1998) and Martin and Rey (2001), the risky investment projects are such that each
4We discuss in appendix VI how our results would be aﬀected by a more general convex cost function.
5If the ￿xed cost has an impact on aggregate income, the main results of the model are unaﬀected. However, the
results are analytically less tractable.
6project gives dividends in only one state of nature. The payoﬀ structure is such that project i yields
d in state i and 0 otherwise. Note that investment projects in the two countries have the exact same
ex-ante expected dividend, d/N. All projects are traded on the stock market at the end of period one,
so that each project corresponds to an asset. This implies that buying a share in a speci￿c project
is equivalent to investing in a Arrow-Debreu security that pays in only one state of nature. This will
give agents in both countries a strong incentive for diversi￿cation that will materialize in the purchase
of shares of both foreign and domestic projects. No duplication occurs in equilibrium so that each
project/asset in the world is unique6. This could obviously lead to some exercise of monopolistic
power. We however assume that project developers do not exploit this potential power. The issue of
monopolistic competition in this type of framework is dealt with in Martin and Rey (2001) who show
that it creates another source of ￿nancial home bias.
We assume that the number of states of nature N is large enough so that N>Z w where Zw =
L(zE + zI) is the total number of investment projects/assets issued in the world. N − Zw is the
endogenous degree of incompleteness of ￿nancial markets as the number of investment projects/assets




           

d 00... 00
0 d 0 ... 00
00d ... 00




           

N ← −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
At the end of the ￿rst period, consumption takes place. Shares in the projects are sold on each
of the stock markets. These shares can be traded internationally but international trade in assets
between the industrialized country and the emerging market entails a transaction cost. An agent
in either country who wants to buy assets in the other market must pay such a cost7,w h i c hm a y
capture government regulations on capital ￿ows, diﬀerences in regulations in accounting, banking and
commission fees, exchange rate transaction fees and information costs. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996)
use a similar type of proportional transaction costs on capital ￿o w sa n df o c u so nt h ec o s to fa c q u i r i n g
information about foreign countries. We will interpret ￿nancial globalization as a process through
which these transaction costs are reduced but not eliminated. The situation of zero transaction
costs will be interesting theoretically but we do not see it as empirically relevant. The presence of
6It can be checked that no investor has an incentive to duplicate an existing project as long as the total number of
projects/assets is less than the number of states of nature. We assume that N is large enough so that this the case. The
intuition is that as long as some states of nature have not been covered, the price of an asset associated to these states
will always be higher than if the agent was to replicate an existing project/asset.
7These costs are borne by the buyer. The results would be identical if sellers were to pay them.
7these transaction costs will translate into a home bias in asset holdings. We denote the transaction
costs on in￿ows τin, and assume that they take the form of an iceberg cost8. This implies that the
transaction fee is paid in shares and the resource cost is borne is second period. Agents have to buy
1+τin > 1 units of shares to receive one share. This modelling implies that the transaction involved
by international trade in assets consumes real resources. Similarly, an agent in the emerging market
who buys shares from the industrialized country must pay a transaction cost 1+τout > 1 on these
out￿ows. We will analyze both the case of symmetric liberalization - where these transaction costs
are lowered simultaneously - and the case of asymmetric liberalization. Transaction costs could also
be levied on dividends that are repatriated. This would increase the home bias as shown in Martin
and Rey (2001). Also, as in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001), the ￿nancial home bias could be derived in
our model from the existence of transport costs on goods as goods need eventually to be shipped in
the second period to pay the dividends.
We assume that the utility of an agent in each country is given by the non-expected utility function
introduced by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989, 1990). This allows the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (which we assume to be 1 for simplicity) to be diﬀerent from the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion ρ .









i = E,I (1)
The ￿rst-period budget constraint of an agent in E who undertakes projects is:






(1+ τout)pIjsEj = wE +
zE X
h=1
pEh − F − f(zE)+T (2)
where YE is per-capita income in ￿rst period of the emerging country, T is the transfer (which in
equilibrium is equal to F)a n dsEi and sEj are demands for shares of risky projects developed in
the emerging market and in the industrialized country respectively. pEi and pIj are the prices of the
diﬀerent assets. The budget constraint in the industrialized country is analogous. In the last period,
income and consumption derive only from dividends of shares purchased in the ￿rst period. Hence,
the budget constraint for an agent in E is given by:
c2E(n)=dsEn,n ∈ [1,Zw] (3)
where we already made use of the fact that only a subset Zw = L(zE + zI) of the N states of nature
are spanned by traded assets. Hence, we can rewrite the utility of an agent in the emerging market
as:
8These iceberg transaction costs are borrowed from the trade and geography literature. See Martin and Rey (2001)
for a more precise description. This modelization allows the elasticity of substitution between assets to be the same for
all agents and also does not require the formal introduction of a sector that performs the transaction.
8Ui =l nci1 +l nβ
d

















Note that in second period, this utility function is similar to the one introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz
to represent preferences for diﬀerentiated products. Because in equilibrium markets are incomplete,
c o n s u m p t i o ni ns e c o n dp e r i o di sz e r oi ns o m es t a t e so fn a t u r e 9. We therefore need to restrict ρ to
be between 0 and 1.A sρ is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between assets (see below),
this again resembles the assumption in the diﬀerentiated products literature that the elasticity of
substitution between diﬀerent varieties is greater than 1. This restriction also implies that assets are
substitutes rather than complements as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) so that a source of multiple
equilibria that they analyse does not exist here.
3 When things go well
3.1 Investment and portfolio decisions
Agents in both countries choose consumption (cE1 and cI1) and investment (the number of projects
zE and zI) at the beginning of the ￿rst period. For this, they need to form expectations about the
number of projects in which other agents will engage, because it will have an impact on the price
of the assets that they will sell at the end of the ￿rst period. We will see in the next section that
a coordination problem can arise such that in some equilibria, no investment is performed. We
￿rst solve the model for the case of an equilibrium in which both countries invest in risky projects
(zE,z I > 0) so that no "crash" occurs. Agents choose optimally their portfolio of assets (domestic
and foreign). For notational simplicity, we note that as projects/assets are ex-ante symmetric, the
d e m a n df o re a c ha s s e ti nag i v e nc o u n t r yw i l lb ei d e n t i c a l 10:w ec a l lsEE the demand for shares of a
"typical" asset in the E market by an agent in that market. sEI is the demand for an asset of the I
market by an agent in the E market. Also, because of the symmetry of projects and agents in each
country, all assets in a given country have the same price which we denote by pE and pI, respectively.
Hence, the equilibrium is de￿ned as a set of allocations [cE1,c I1,z E,z I,c E2(n),c I1(n)],p o r t f o -
lio shares [sEE,s EI,s II,s IE] and asset prices [pE,p I] such that: 1) [cE1,z E,s EE,s EI,c E2(n)] maxi-
mize UE subject to E￿s budget constraints (equations (2) and (3)); 2) [cI1,z I,s II,s IE,c I2(n)] max-
imize UI subject to I￿s budget constraints (the analogous of equations (2) and (3)); 3) asset mar-
kets clear: LsEE + L(1 + τin)sIE =1and LsII + L(1 + τout)sEI =1 ; 4) Goods markets clear:
L[cE1 + cI1 + f(zE)+f(zI)] = L(wE + wI).
9We discuss in section 4 how the inclusion of riskless projects that would allow consumption to be positive in all
states of nature would aﬀect our results.
10In a given country, agents are diﬀerent in the sense that they choose diﬀerent projects but they choose identical
portfolios and consumption patterns.
9The ￿rst order conditions for maximization for an agent in the emerging market imply the following































The equality between marginal cost and the expected price of the asset implies that the number of
projects depends positively on the expected share price. Note also that the elasticity of substitution
between assets is constant and equal to the inverse of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, ρ.
Analogous conditions hold in the industrialized country.
For all agents in the economy to invest, it must be that the expected pro￿tability of such projects
is positive, or pe
EzE− 1
2z2
E−F ≥ 0. This can be rewritten as 1
2p2 e
E ≥ F .I ft h e￿xed cost is higher than
this, we need to analyse equilibria in which a fraction only of agents invest. We do this in appendix
IV. The analysis and results are not qualitatively diﬀerent so we focus here on the case where all
agents invest.
Using the budget constraint and the ￿rst-order conditions above, the typical demand by agents
in the emerging economy for shares of a domestic project (sEE) and for shares of an industrialized





















where φout =( 1+τout)1−1/ρ is a transformation of transaction costs on purchases of assets of the
industrialized country. As ρ < 1, we interpret an increase in φout as a reduction in transaction costs
on out￿ows. Note that 0 ≤ φout ≤ 1. From a theoretical point of view, it is interesting to note that
non-expected utility combined with assets with linearly independent payoﬀs generates a demand for
shares that has the same form as those derived in trade models with transportation costs and Dixit-
Stiglitz type preferences. Note also that the demand for individual shares increases with income, and
decreases with the total number of projects/assets. Finally, demand for foreign shares decreases with
transaction costs on international trade in assets. Even for identical asset prices, a home bias will
emerge in asset demands.
Projects have a ￿xed unit size and population is equal in each country11, so that the equilibrium
11We discuss the consequences of diﬀerent population size in appendix VI.

























where φin =( 1+τin)1−1/ρ < 1 and q = pE/pI is the relative price of assets between emerging and
industrialized markets. These two equations give the equilibrium conditions on the stock market for
a typical asset in the emerging market and a typical asset in the industrialized market. There are
L(zE + zI) such equilibrium conditions. In the parenthesis, the ￿rst term represents the demand
coming from domestic agents and the second term the demand coming from foreigners (inclusive of
the transaction costs). Note that these equations imply a ￿nancial home-market eﬀect, in the sense
that local income will have a more important impact on the local asset market than foreign income,
as long as φout and φin are less than 1, i.e. as long as some transaction costs exist12.
The stock market equilibrium implies that total world income in the ￿rst period is ￿xed. To see
this, note from the stock market equilibrium that: pEzE + pIzI =
β
1+β(YE + YI). Using the optimal
investment rule and the de￿nition of world income, we get that L(YE+YI)=
2L(1+β)
2+β (wE+wI). Total
consumption in the world is given by the world resource constraint L(cE + cI)=
2L(wE+wI)
2+β .
It is useful to rewrite the price of assets in terms of the relative price using the constraint on world








(2 + β)(1 + q2)
(11)
This implies that an increase in the relative price of assets corresponds to an increase in investment
in the emerging market and a decrease of investment in the industrialized one. The relationships with
per-capita income are as follows:
YE = wE +
β(wE + wI)
(2 + β)[1+q−2]




An increase in the relative price of assets in the emerging market is associated with an increase in
income in this country.
3.2 Equilibrium relationship between asset prices and income shares
We ￿rst examine the case of symmetric transaction costs (φin = φout = φ). We believe that this is
the most empirically relevant case as emerging economies that liberalized capital movements, with
12It is easy to check that if transaction costs were levied on the dividends in the second period at the level τd,t h e n
φout =(
1+τout
1−τd )1−1/ρ and φin =(
1+τin
1−τd )1−1/ρso that the home bias would be even larger.
11the objective for example of attracting foreign capital, liberalized both out￿ows and in￿ows. We will
analyze in Section 5 the case where this liberalization is not fully symmetric.
As world income is ￿xed, it proves convenient to de￿ne sY = YE/(YE +YI) as the share of income
in the emerging market. Equation (9) of the stock market equilibrium can be rewritten as:
q =
sY zI(1 − φ
2)+zEφq1−1/ρ + zIφ
2
zIφq1/ρ−1 + zE − sY zE(1 − φ
2)
(13)
Note that if φ =1(zero transaction costs) then q =1 , which implies that without any ￿nancial
segmentation, the price of assets is identical in the two countries.
There are three equilibrium relations that help us solve the model in the case with positive invest-
ment in both countries. These are the income equation (2), the optimal investment equation (5), and
the equilibrium on the stock markets (9). By eliminating the optimal investment equation, we can
reduce the model to two equilibrium relations between sY and q, the share of income and the relative
asset price in the emerging market. From (11), we get immediately the equilibrium income relation,
which we call the YY schedule:
sY =




2(1 + β)(1 + q−2)
(14)
where sw = wE/(wE+wI) < 1/2, is the share of wage income in the emerging market. The equilibrium
YY relation says that an increase in the relative asset price q generates an increase in sY ,t h ei n c o m e
share of the emerging market. The reason is that projects are sold at a higher price and more projects
are started.
Combining the optimal investment equation with the equilibrium on the stock markets (12), which
pins down the equilibrium relative asset price, we get a second relation between sY and q, which we









This equilibrium relationship re￿ects that a higher share of income in the emerging market leads to
a higher relative asset price (we show in appendix II that ∂sY /∂q>0). An increase in income in the
emerging market leads to an increase in saving which, as long as markets are segmented (φ < 1), falls
disproportionately on domestic assets. The increase in demand in turn generates higher asset prices
in the emerging market. This mechanism is the ￿nancial market size eﬀect identi￿ed in Martin and
Rey (2001).
On ￿gure 3, we illustrate the equilibrium as the intersection of the YY and qq schedules. The
important result is that the relative price of assets in the emerging market is always less than 1 as
long as the two markets are not perfectly integrated (φ 6=1 )a n dsw < 1/2. In appendix III, we show











Figure 3: An increase in productivity in the emerging market
The asset price in the emerging market is less than in the industrialized country, the more so, the
larger the diﬀerential in productivities. Note that this implies that investment in the emerging market
will be less than in the industrialized market even though projects have, ex-ante, the same payoﬀs.
This also implies that as long as international ￿nancial markets are segmented, the diﬀerential in
productivity will be magni￿ed by diﬀerential investment (sY <s w < 1/2). To see this graphically,
suppose wE increases. This shifts up the YY curve. The increase in income in the emerging market
comes in two parts. The direct eﬀect increases the income share from A to B while the increase in the
asset price of the emerging market further increases the income share from B to C. The magni￿cation
eﬀect comes from the increased investment and wealth eﬀect induced by the increase in asset price.
If ￿nancial markets (φ =1 ) were perfectly integrated, the qq curve would be vertical at q =1 .
In such a case, an increase in the wage level of the emerging market, a shift of the YY curve has no
eﬀect on the relative asset prices and therefore would have no ampli￿cation eﬀect on relative income.
3.3 Financial globalization and asset prices
We now analyze the impact of a decrease in transaction costs on international trade in assets which
causes φ to rise. The eﬀect of an increase in φ on the qq curve can be seen by examining how sY is













T h i se x p r e s s i o ni sn e g a t i v ea sl o n ga sq<1 that is as long as sw < 1/2. The symmetric decrease in












Figure 4: A symmetric decrease in transaction costs
The fall in transaction costs causes both the income share in the emerging market and the relative
price of assets to increase. The intuition is that lower transaction costs on international trade in assets
attract foreign investment as the price of a typical asset in the emerging market is lower than one
on the industrialized market, even though the assets are identical ex-ante. Lower transaction costs
on trade in assets also enable both countries to engage in more inter-temporal trade13:t h e r i c h e r
industrialized country can lend more to the emerging market. This explains why the relative demand
for the assets of the emerging market rises. As the asset price in the emerging market becomes higher,
the incentive to invest in that country is strengthened, so that income increases further, as does the
domestic demand for assets in the emerging market.
3.4 Financial globalization and the current account
It is interesting to investigate the impact of ￿nancial globalization on the ￿rst period current account
of the emerging market in our setting. The current account is the diﬀerence between the country￿s
production and its investment and consumption :


















It is easy to check from (13) and (14) that if φ =0 ,t h e nq2 = wE/wI so that the current account is
balanced. As q2 increases with lower transaction costs and is always higher than wE/wI when φ > 0,
the current account of the emerging market is in de￿cit. The current account de￿cit of the emerging
market increases with lower transaction costs on trade in assets (higher φ). This is consistent with the
previous section where we showed that liberalizing capital movements would generate higher relative
asset prices in the emerging market. The capital in￿ows generated by such liberalization are just the
mirror image of the adjustment in prices. Capital in￿ows are larger than out￿o w sa sa g e n t si nt h e
industrialized economy take advantage of the lower asset prices in the emerging market. This is made
easier as transaction costs between the two markets decrease.
3.5 Financial globalization and market incompleteness
In the "good" equilibrium ￿nancial globalization alleviates market incompleteness, thus reduces the
volatility of consumption in the second period. The reason is that the total number of assets increases
as transaction costs decrease. The total number of assets is Zw = L(zE + zI)=L(pE + pI). It
can easily been shown that the total number of assets is increasing in q so that ∂Zw/∂φ > 0. This
just comes from the convexity of the investment cost function: as the price of assets increases in the
emerging market with lower transaction costs, the number of assets in the emerging market increases
more than it decreases in the industrialized country. From that point of view, ￿nancial globalization is
stabilizing. However, this is when "things go well" that is when agents are optimistic about investment
prospects in the emerging market. In the next Section, we analyze a case when "things go wrong".
In this case, ￿nancial globalization can become destabilizing.
4 Self-fulﬁlling expectations and ﬁnancial integration: when
things go wrong
Until now, we have focused on equilibria in which both countries invest in a positive number of projects.
However, the decision to invest at the beginning of the period depends crucially on the expected price
of assets at the end of the period when the stock markets open and shares in the projects are traded.
The expected asset price (which can be interpreted as the inverse of the cost of capital) determines
whether investment is pro￿table. We now investigate under what condition a crash driven by self-
ful￿lling expectations can occur. In particular, we are interested in the impact of transaction costs on
this possibility. We ask the following question: under which conditions, can a rational expectations
equilibrium exists in which agents in the emerging market do not invest? Or to put it another way,
when is the expected price low enough that a single agent will ￿nd it unpro￿table to invest? The
condition for this to happen is that πe
E = pe
Ee zE − 1
2e z2
E − F ≤ 0 which implies that the pro￿tability
15condition is not ful￿lled or that no agent will deviate from the zero-investment equilibrium. e zE in this
condition is the investment that would be done by a single ￿pessimistic￿ agent if she anticipates that
no other single agent will invest (so Lze
E =0 ) . The optimal investment rule e zE = pe
E still applies here.
This agent is small (L is large) so that her decision does not aﬀect aggregate income or investment.
Suppose that ze
E =0 . Aggregate income in the emerging market is LY e
E = LwE as expected
wealth goes to zero. As world income is ￿xed, expected income in the industrialized country increases
by the amount it falls in the emerging market. This expected change in the distribution of world
income is important because it determines the expected relative demands for assets in the emerging
and industrialized economies. Using the stock market equilibrium (9) in this case, it can be checked

















Note that the expected relative price in this case decreases with ￿nancial globalization (higher
φ)a tl o wl e v e l so fφ and then increases at high levels of ￿nancial globalization. The pro￿tability of





(wE + wI)qe 2 − F (19)



















The pro￿t function is U-shaped as a function of φ and so inequality (20) can be satis￿ed for interme-
diate levels of transaction costs.
For multiple equilibria to exist, it must be that for a given set of parameter values, a "good"
equilibrium exists when ze
E > 0 and does not exist when ze
E =0 .I f F is large enough, there will
always be a set of intermediate transaction costs for which the zero-investment equilibrium exists.
From (20) it can be checked that the zero-investment equilibrium cannot occur without capital ￿ows
(φ =0 ) or with perfect capital mobility (φ =1 ). This is intuitive. In a situation of ￿nancial autarky,
agents can only save by buying domestic assets. This puts a ￿oor on the demand for domestic assets
and hence on their expected price as capital ￿ight is impossible. In a situation of perfect capital
mobility, q =1 , so arbitrage implies that agents in the industrialized country would rush to buy the
assets in the emerging market in the event of a crash. This rules out a crash on asset prices in the
emerging market. In this case, if it is pro￿table to invest in the industrialized country it must be so
also in the emerging market. Another way to say this is that a global ￿nancial crash is not possible.
This is the same reasoning as for the impossibility of a crash in autarky.
16The possibility of multiple equilibria and its dependence on transaction costs is illustrated in ￿gure




I > 0) schedule shows the dependence of asset prices in the industrialized
country on transaction costs in the good (￿optimistic￿) equilibrium. It decreases as transaction costs
are lowered as asset prices in the industrialized country and in the emerging market converge. The
inverse happens with the πe
E(ze
E > 0,ze
I > 0) schedule which illustrates that pro￿ts in the emerging
market increase with lower transaction costs. The πe
E(ze
E =0 )schedule shows the dependence of
pro￿t in the emerging market on transaction costs in the ￿pessimistic￿ case. If we choose the ￿xed
cost F such that in the case of multiple equilibria, the good equilibrium is characterized by all agents
investing then the zero pro￿t frontier is given by the dashed horitontal line. In this case, multiple
equilibria arise for the emerging market between φ1 and φ2.I f t h e ￿xed cost is higher, the "good"
equilibrium in the emerging market is one where only a fraction of agents invest and multiple equilibria
arise for a larger set of transaction costs (the zero pro￿t line is shifted upward). If the ￿xed cost is
lower, the area of multiple equilibria shrinks.
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Figure 5: Multiple equilibria and transaction costs
As is usual in models with multiple equilibria, circular causation is at work here. If agents believe
that other agents will undertake no project, they then expect aggregate income in the emerging market
at the end of the period to be low. Lower expected income entails a lower demand for assets. When
￿nancial markets are segmented and assets are imperfect substitutes, then this fall of demand of
17assets will fall disproportionately on local assets. This in turn generates a low relative asset price
in the emerging market. This is a home bias eﬀect. Finally, the optimal investment rule says that
investment depends positively on the expected asset price which we can interpret as the inverse of the
cost of capital.
The circular causality mechanism has common features with the agglomeration phenomena de-
scribed in the ￿new economic geography￿ literature. Here, we could talk of an ￿agglomeration of
expectations￿ which produces a coordination failure. However, the stability properties are diﬀerent:
in our model, the "good" equilibrium is always stable, whereas in the ￿new economic geography￿
literature, a fundamental result is that the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable for suﬃciently
low transaction costs.
I st h ee m e r g i n gm a r k e tm o r ev u l n e r a b l et oa￿nancial crash than the industrialized economy? To
answer this question we can compare the pro￿t level of a single ￿pessimistic￿ investor in the emerging
market (ze
E =0 ) given in equation (18) to its analog in the industrialized country (ze
I =0 ). It can
be checked that the πe
I(ze
I =0 )function is the same as in equation (18) except for the term in sw
which is replaced by 1 − sw. One can see readily that πe
I(ze
I =0 )> πe
E(ze
E =0 )as long as φ < 1,
so that the ￿pessimist￿ pro￿t function of the industrialized country is always higher than the one for
emerging market as illustrated in ￿gure 5. Moreover, for the level of ￿xed cost such that multiple
equilibria become possible in the emerging market, the industrialized country cannot have a crash14.
This is because it is possible to show that πe
I(ze
I =0 )> πe
I(ze
I > 0,ze
E > 0) > πe
E(ze
I > 0,ze
E > 0) for
all levels of transaction costs. In this case, multiple equilibria in a world of countries with identical
productivities (sw =1 /2) are not possible either.
The reason for the lower vulnerability of the industrialized economy to ￿nancial crashes, is that the
demand for assets in that market even when depressed by pessimistic expectations is always higher
than in the emerging market. This in turn implies a higher price for assets and higher pro￿tability on
the industrialized country asset market even when bad times are expected: the industrialized country
can never be as pessimistic about its own income level and therefore its asset prices as the emerging
market.
How do fundamentals aﬀect the possibility of a ￿nancial crash? For a given distribution of wage
income (a given sw), equation (20) shows that when ￿world￿ productivity and wage levels (wE +wI)
are high, the pro￿t function of a single ￿pessimistic￿ agent is higher and therefore the set of parameters
for which a ￿nancial crash is possible is smaller. The reason is that greater world income generates
a higher demand for shares, irrespective of expectations, which partially will bene￿t the emerging
market.
Also, fundamentals in the emerging market are important. For given world fundamentals (wE+wI),
14The maximum number of equilibria is 2 in this case. This is because if F ≤ F1 =
βwE
2+β , the "good" equilibrium is
such that all agents invest in the emerging market and it is possible to show that the YY and qq curves only cross once.
If F>F 1, then the "good "equilibrium is such that not all agents invest. This equilibrium is also unique (see appendix
IV).
18a higher productivity and wage level in the emerging market (a higher sw) will increase the pro￿t
level of a ￿pessimistic￿ agent as we know φ < 1. The reason is that higher local income will generate
higher demand for shares, which because of transaction costs on capital ￿ows, will disproportionately
favor shares of the emerging market. Note that this negative relation between income per capita and
the vulnerability to crashes only appears when countries are suﬃciently open to capital movements,
a fact that accords with the two graphs we present in introduction.
The ￿nancial crash in the emerging market is characterized by low asset prices, investment, income
and consumption (both in ￿rst period and in second period). Per-capita income in the emerging
market is lower in the case of a ￿nancial crash (wE)t h a ni na u t a r k y( 2(1 + β)wE/(2 + β)). This
level is itself the lowest for the emerging market among all "good" equilibria with positive investment.
Also, contrary to what occurs in the "good" equilibrium, in the event of a crash, the emerging country
experiences a current account surplus, basically because it has no assets to sell. In this case, we can
also characterize the ￿nancial crash as a situation of capital ￿ight since the only assets that agents
can buy to save and diversify risk are foreign.
These characteristics of the crash ￿t the stylized facts of the emerging markets. In particular,
investment in our model is the component which is hit the hardest, consistent with the ￿ndings of
Tornell and Westermann (2001). They also ￿nd that the bust is followed by a recession. Other authors
have insisted on the fall in asset prices that are typically the starting point of the crisis and the reversal
in the current account situation.
We have seen that "when things go well", ￿nancial globalization decreases the volatility of second-
period consumption as it decreases market incompleteness measured by (N −LzE −LzI). Obviously,
when investment crashes in the emerging market the number of assets falls in that country. To see
how the number of assets at the world level is aﬀected by the crash, we compare the extent of market
incompleteness in the case of a ￿nancial crash (zE =0 ) to the measure of market incompleteness in
the non crash equilibrium in ￿nancial autarky (φ =0 ) , which we know is the situation where market
incompleteness is at its maximum for the "good" equilibrium. The total number of assets in the later
s i t u a t i o ni sh i g h e rt h a ni nas i t u a t i o no f￿nancial crash15. Hence, market incompleteness is higher in
the situation of the ￿nancial crash than in the situation of ￿nancial autarky. This implies that in a
crash not only income and consumption levels are lower but volatility of second-period consumption
is also higher.
The introduction of riskless and low return projects would make a crash possible even in autarky. In
such circumstances, if agents expect that no high return risky investment projects will be implemented
and that agents will substitute to low return riskless projects, they expect aggregate income, demand
for assets of the risky projects and their relative price to be low. In eﬀect, the possibility of an
alternative form of domestic investment with low return would be similar to the possibility of capital




I ).I nac r a s h ,i tf a l l st oL[2β/(2 +
β)]1/2(wE + wI)1/2.
19￿ight in our model. This would resemble the logic of the model of Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny
(1989). As long as the cost of riskless investments is not too high, a crash of prices of risky investment
projects would be possible, even in autarky. However, facilitating the purchase of foreign assets with
high return would still increase the possibility of a ￿nancial crash, albeit one of a diﬀerent nature:
agents in the emerging market would substitute into risky high-return foreign assets in place of riskless
low-return domestic assets. The emerging market would still be more vulnerable to this type of crash
than the industrialized country: in the pessimistic case, its income and therefore demand for domestic
assets would still fall more than those of the industrialized country.
5 Asymmetric ﬁnancial liberalization
5.1 Asymmetric transaction costs and the "good" equilibrium
Our framework allows us to distinguish between transaction costs on ￿nancial in￿ows and out￿ows,
so that we can analyze the impact of asymmetric liberalization policies. In the case of asymmetric
transaction costs, the YY schedule, (equation 13) still applies. The qq schedule that de￿nes the stock





(1 + q2)(1− φinφout)
(21)
The impact of a decrease in transaction costs on in￿ows (an increase in φin) is shown on ￿gure
6 as a rightward shift of the modi￿ed qq curve (see appendix V for the proof). To compare the
impact of symmetric and asymmetric ￿nancial globalization, we have depicted both types on the
same graph. Starting from a situation with identical transaction costs on in￿ows and out￿ows (point
A), a symmetric decrease in transaction costs leads to point B which implies an increase in both q
and sY ,i fwI >w E. A decrease in transaction costs on in￿ows, will shift the equilibrium to point C,
implying a larger increase in both q and sY than in the symmetric case16.
It is easy to check that a decrease in transaction costs on out￿ows shifts the modi￿ed qq curve
on the left as shown on ￿gure 7. Both the asset price and the income level decrease because lower
transaction costs on out￿ows induce domestic agents in the emerging market to switch from domestic
to foreign assets. Note that contrary to the case of symmetric liberalization, the sign of the impact of
asymmetric liberalization on asset prices and income share does not depend on the diﬀerence in wage
rates.
16Claessens and Rhee (1994) ￿nd evidence of a positive relation between a stock￿s P/E-ratio and its accessibility by























Figure 7: A decrease in transaction costs on out￿ows
215.2 Asymmetric transaction costs and ﬁnancial crashes
We can perform the same analysis as in section 4 and analyze how asymmetric transaction costs
aﬀect the possibility of a ￿nancial crash driven by self-ful￿lling expectations. The condition for the
















Hence, quite intuitively, a combination of low transaction costs on out￿ows and high transaction
costs on in￿ows makes it easier to have a zero-investment equilibrium where a ￿pessimistic￿ agent
d o e sn o te x p e c ti tt ob ep r o ￿table to start investment projects.
6 Domestic and international ﬁnancial liberalization
6.1 Domestic transaction costs and the "good" equilibrium
We can also use our model to analyze how the interaction of domestic and international ￿nancial
liberalization aﬀect asset prices and investment. To do this, we introduce a new type of transaction
costs on ￿nancial markets of the emerging country. On top of the transaction costs on in￿ows and
out￿ows (which are again identical), agents in the emerging market, when they buy domestic assets
pay a domestic transaction cost, which also takes the form of an iceberg cost. This may be thought as a
proxy for domestic ￿nancial under-development. We assume that no such transaction cost hampers the
domestic market in the industrialized country so that we depart from the rest of the paper where the
only diﬀerence between the two countries was their productivity level. We call φD, the transformation
of domestic transaction costs: φD =( 1+τD)
1−1/ρ, where τD is the domestic transaction cost which
we assume is lower than the international transaction cost so that φD > φ. The model is unchanged
except for the stock market equilibrium conditions which become:
This just says that higher domestic transaction costs reduce asset demand from domestic agents.









Hence, a decrease in domestic ￿nancial transaction costs shifts the qq curve to the right and induces
an increase in asset prices, investment and income. The working is qualitatively the inverse of the one
shown in ￿gure 8. This is not surprising as an increase in transaction costs on out￿ows and a decrease
in domestic transaction costs both lead to an increase of demand of assets by domestic agents.
226.2 Domestic transaction costs and ﬁnancial crashes
The introduction of domestic transaction costs makes it easier to get the zero-investment equilibrium.
The reason is that by decreasing demand for domestic assets it decreases further the relative expected
asset price and therefore expected pro￿tability of investment projects when agents are pessimistic. To
















The expected pro￿t is lower, the higher the domestic transaction costs (the lower φD). Hence,
lower transaction costs on domestic markets in the emerging market will reduce the parameter set for
which zero-investment equilibrium driven solely by self-fulling expectations is possible.
7 Welfare implications
The welfare implications are numerous and complex. In the previous sections, we have seen that
lowering transaction costs on asset trade had consequences on: real resources lost in the transaction,
relative asset prices, investment and income and therefore consumption in both ￿rst and second
period, the degree of market incompleteness and therefore the volatility of consumption in second
period. Lowering transaction costs on trade in assets could also move the emerging market in a totally
diﬀerent situation characterized by a ￿nancial crash driven by self-ful￿lling pessimistic expectations.
We ￿rst analyze the welfare impact of lower transaction costs in the "optimistic" case with positive
investment in both countries. The level of utility of an agent in the emerging market is given by the
following expression:














where C is a constant. There are three distinct eﬀects of lowering transaction costs on international
asset trade that can be identi￿ed in the three last terms of the above equation: 1) an income eﬀect:
For the emerging market, we know it will be a positive eﬀect for a symmetric decrease of transaction
costs on in￿ows and out￿ows and for a decrease of transaction costs on in￿ows. It will be negative
on income in the case of a decrease of transaction costs on out￿ows. 2) a price eﬀect: the price of
assets of the emerging market will follow the same pattern as income. However, the welfare eﬀect may
be diﬀerent. On the one hand, for a given income, higher prices in the emerging market imply lower
demand for those assets which lowers welfare. On the other hand, higher asset prices in the emerging
market generate higher investment and a higher number of assets and therefore more diversi￿cation
possibilities. If ρ > 1/2, so that agents are ￿very￿ risk averse, the increase in diversi￿cation possibility
will be highly valued and an increase in pE will increase welfare. 3) a direct eﬀect: with lower
23transaction costs on out￿ows (higher φout) , it becomes less costly to diversify. Hence, this eﬀect is
always positive.
We will not be able to analytically derive the welfare impact of decreasing transaction costs on trade
in asset for all levels of transaction costs. However, we can evaluate welfare impacts of liberalization
of capital ￿ows around the autarky equilibrium and the perfect capital mobility equilibrium. For
example, an asymmetric decrease of transaction costs around the autarky situation has the following



















As wE <w I,i ti m p l i e st h a ti f ρ ≥ 1/2, then the expression above is always positive and utility
increases with liberalization of capital out￿ows17. The intuition is that in this case of high risk
aversion, the possibility to diversify at a lower cost is highly valued by agents of the emerging market.
If ρ < 1/2 and the wage diﬀerence is suﬃciently large, then the negative income eﬀect dominates and
the utility of agents in the emerging market will decrease. Evaluated in the perfect capital mobility






















which is always positive. This is also the case when evaluated in the perfect capital mobility case.
The impact of a symmetric decrease in transaction costs on in￿ows and out￿ows on welfare eval-
















which is always positive18. This is also the case when evaluated at φ =1 . This is not surprising as
we know that all eﬀects described above are positive in this case for the emerging market.
These results on welfare are valid only for the "good" equilibrium and as usual in models with
possible multiple equilibria, we cannot say anything de￿nitive about welfare. In cases where the crisis
equilibrium is a possible equilibrium we can however show that if the emerging market falls in the crisis
17Note that if the two countries have equal wages, the utility always increases with liberalization of capital ￿ows.
18It can be shown that, despite its negative impact on its income, this is also true for the industrialized country.
24equilibrium its welfare is always less than in the "good" equilibrium at the same level of transaction
cost. This is obvious as the crisis equilibrium implies lower income and therefore less consumption (in
both periods) and more market incompleteness (as measured by the diﬀerence between the number of
states and the number of assets) and therefore more second-period consumption volatility. However,
it is impossible to give a de￿nitive answer to the question: should emerging economies liberalize
capital movements, say in a symmetric fashion (an increase in φ)?. We know that if they could, they
should go all the way to perfect capital mobility (φ =1 ), because in this case income in the emerging
market is maximized, market incompleteness is minimized and ￿nancial crash cannot occur. However,
our view is that transaction costs always hinder international trade in assets (due to diﬀerence in
regulations, cost of acquiring information, exchange rate movements...) even without government
imposed transaction costs. We can answer a more limited but relevant question: is welfare in the
emerging economy higher in the autarky equilibrium or in the crisis equilibrium? The diﬀerence
between the two levels of welfare is given by:












where parameters (in particular the level of transaction costs) must be such that a crisis is a possible
equilibrium. The ￿rst term of the expression is positive and re￿ects the fact that income is higher in
autarky than in crisis with capital movements. The last term is negative and re￿ects the welfare gain
of being able to better diversify by purchasing foreign assets even in a ￿nancial crash. The second
term has an ambiguous sign and re￿ects the fact that in a crisis equilibrium there are more assets to
buy than in autarky but which must be purchased at a higher price. If agents are suﬃciently risk
averse (high ρ) they will value this and therefore the expression is negative. When we evaluate this
expression at levels of φ for which a ￿nancial crash is possible (that is between the two roots of the
quadratic expression 23), we ￿nd that the sign is ambiguous. In particular, if agents are not too risk
averse (low ρ) welfare can be higher in autarky than in the ￿nancial crisis equilibrium. This is because
in this case the welfare gain of being able to buy foreign assets is not valued very much and the loss
of income in the ￿nancial crash situation is what matters most. For the industrialized country, the
welfare impact of a crash in the emerging market has an ambiguous eﬀect on welfare. The reason is
that even though its income rises because of the in￿ows of capital coming from the emerging market,
its diversi￿cation opportunities decrease as the total number of assets decreases. For ρ =1 /2,f o r
example, it is easy to check that the income eﬀect dominates. For high coeﬃcients of risk aversion,
however, the loss in diversi￿cation opportunities may dominate.
Again, our implications for welfare should be taken with caution as we can not say which equi-
librium will prevail. Hence, our model can only point to the conclusion that ￿nancial globalization
carries bene￿ts and risks in terms of welfare for emerging markets.
8C o n c l u s i o n
25Under which conditions can ￿nancial globalization be held responsible for the recent series of ￿nancial
crashes in emerging markets? In answering this question, the existing literature has insisted on the
fact that ￿nancial globalization, because it makes borrowing on world ￿nancial markets easier and
less costly, may strengthen the potential danger of market failures prevalent in emerging markets: in
particular, moral hazard and credit constraints have been shown to facilitate the advent of ￿nancial
crisis driven by self-ful￿lling expectations. In this paper, we show that the existence of such market
failures is not a necessary condition for emerging markets to become vulnerable to a ￿nancial crash
when capital ￿ows are liberalized. Both the potential bene￿to f￿nancial globalization (in terms of
cost of capital, investment and income) and the higher vulnerability of emerging markets to a ￿nancial
crash come from the same and unique factor that diﬀerentiates emerging markets and industrialized
countries in our model: their productivity and income level. The higher vulnerability is not due to bad
fundamentals, bad institutions, bad ￿nancial markets (credit or liquidity constraints), bad incentives
(bailouts) or bad exchange rate regimes. This is not to say of course that these problems do not exist
or do not constitute important channels through which ￿nancial globalization can make emerging
markets more vulnerable to a ￿nancial crisis19. But it suggests that the risks of liberalization of
capital ￿ows for emerging markets are a very general feature.
That ￿nancial globalization can make emerging markets more vulnerable to a ￿nancial crash under
the mere condition that these countries have a lower income than industrialized countries has also
potentially important policy implications. The recent literature which has emphasized the key role of
credit constraints and moral hazard to explain crashes in emerging markets has logically recommended
policies which address the informational and institutional frictions which are at the origin of these
credit market imperfections. Among such policies, Mendoza (2001) for example, cites microeconomic
policies such as the development of credit bureaus in Mexico. More transparency, better information,
better banking regulation have also been recommended. Similarly, currency mismatches in ￿xed
exchange rate regimes have listed as prime suspects in the crises of these countries which has led
several countries to switch to ￿oating. Our paper shows that these policies and institutional changes
may not be suﬃcient to prevent crises in intermediate income countries and that ￿nancial crises may
be a much more general phenomenon in those countries.
One implication of our model is that a clear incentive exists for the government of the emerging
market to intervene directly on the stock market with a commitment to buy assets when the price falls
below a certain level. These policies have been advocated and implemented during the Asian crisis.
However, these guarantees would quite naturally generate moral hazard problems which themselves
can be at the origin of a ￿nancial crisis (Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999) . Hence, an interesting
possible extension of our model would be to formalize the trade-oﬀ between endogenous incentives for
government guarantees and moral hazard consequences.
19The inclusion of credit constraints on investment in our model would reinforce the possibility of a crash as the fall
in asset prices would reduce the value of collateral.
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Appendix I: Description of the data used in ￿gures 1 and 2:
Calculations are made using monthly US Dollar based stock indices from Bloomberg and with
W o r l dB a n kd a t ai nU SD o l l a r s . B o t hs e r i e sa r eC P I - a d j u s t e d . A" C r a s h "i sd e ￿ned as a month
in which the monthly percent change of the index is at least two standard deviations (based on the
entire sample) below the average change in index for all countries. The length of the data varies
across countries. There are no countries with data shorter than 24 months. The ￿nancially closed-
open distinction is taken from various sources with a focus on the capital account. As noted in the
literature a 0-1 distinction is not satisfactory, but we believe that the general message of ￿gure 1 and 2
w o u l dn o tb ea l t e r e dw i t ham o r es u b t l eq u a n t i ￿cation. We used primarily the dates for liberalization
indicated by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001). For countries not included in that study we used
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001), Edison and Warnock (2001) and information contained in the
IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (various years). Figure 8 gives the list of
countries, the stock data availability, the years for which the country is considered closed and open
and the respective numbers of crashes.
Appendix II: The characteristics of the YY and qq curves
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Appendix III: The eﬀect of a symmetric decrease in transaction costs
An increase in φ h a sa l w a y sap o s i t i v ei m p a c to nq as long as q<1,t h a ti sa sl o n ga ssW < 1/2.
To see this, use equilibrium equations (13) and (14) to get ∂q/∂φ:
2φ
'





+ β(1 − q2)+1− 2swq2“
+2 ( 1+β)(q2−1/ρ − q1/ρ)
4q(1 + β)(1 − φq−1/ρ)+2
ρφ(1 + β)(q1/ρ−1 + q1−1/ρ) − 2q(1 − φ
2)[2β +( 2+β)sw]
(A3)
which is positive if sW < 1/2. Combining this with the fact that ∂sY
∂φ < 0 on the qq curve also proves
that the YY and qq curves cross only once in the relevant range (0 <q<1) so that a unique "good"
exists. This is because if the two curves were to cross more than once in the relevant range, they
would have to cross three times (the YY curve starts over the qq curve and in q =1is below the qq
curve if sW < 1/2). In this case a downward shift of the qq curve (caused by an increase in φ)w o u l d
27Stock Data Availability Closed Open
Country (source) Start Date End Date Closed Dates Crashes Open Dates Crashes
Argentina (KS) 12/1/75 5/31/99 1966-77, 83-88 15 1978-82,89-01 12
Australia (BB) 5/29/92 9/28/01 1966-83   1984-01 0
Austria (BB) 1/31/92 9/28/01 1966-80   1981-01 0
Belgium (BB) 10/31/88 9/28/01   1966-01 0
Brazil (KS) 12/1/75 5/31/99 1966-75, 80-86 6 1976-79, 87-01 19
Canada (BB) 1/29/60 9/28/01   1966-01 3
Chile (KS) 12/1/75 5/31/99 1966-91 3 1992-01 1
China (BB) 1/31/95 9/28/01 1966-01 1  
Colombia (KS) 12/1/84 5/31/99 1966-90 0 1991-01 2
Czech Rep. (BB) 4/29/94 9/28/01 1992-97 0 1998-01 2
Denmark (KS) 1/1/75 4/30/99 1966-87 0 1988-01 0
Ecuador (BB) 1/31/94 9/28/01 1993-96 0 97-01 6
Egypt (BB) 7/31/92 9/28/01 1966-01 0  
Estonia (BB) 6/28/96 9/28/01     1994-01 5
Finland (KS) 1/1/75 12/31/98 1966-90 0 1991-01 1
France (BB) 1/1/75 12/31/98 1968-85 3 1966-67, 85-01 0
Germany (BB) 1/30/70 9/28/01   1966-01 1
Ghana (BB) 11/30/90 9/28/01 1966-01 0  
Greece (BB) 2/28/92 9/28/01 1966-94   1995-01 2
Hong Kong (BB) 11/28/69 9/28/01   1966-01 13
Hungary (BB) 1/31/91 9/28/01 1981-92 0 1993-01 3
Iceland (BB) 12/31/92 9/28/01 1966-01 0  
India (BB) 1/31/85 9/28/01 1966-01 2  
Indonesia (BB) 4/29/83 9/28/01 1966-95 0 1996-01 9
Ireland (KS) 1/1/75 12/31/98 1966-91 1 1992-01 0
Israel (BB) 1/31/92 9/28/01 1966-01 1  
Italy (KS) 1/1/75 12/31/98 1966-82, 86-92 2 1983-85, 93-01 0
Ivory Coast (BB) 1/29/99 9/28/01 1968-01 0    
Jamaica (BB) 3/31/87 9/28/01 1966-01 3  
Japan (BB) 1/31/73 9/28/01 1966-78 0 1979-01 0
Korea (KS) 12/1/75 5/31/99 1966-92 1 1993-01 5
Kuwait (BB) 4/30/99 9/28/01   1966-01 0
Latvia (BB) 1/30/98 9/28/01     1994-01 3
Luxembourg (BB) 1/29/99 9/28/01   1966-01 1
Malaysia (BB) 1/31/77 9/28/01 99-01 0 1973-98 9
Malta (BB) 7/31/97 9/28/01 1968-01 0  
Mexico (KS) 1/1/75 5/31/99 1983-92 2 1966-82, 93-01 10
Morocco (BB) 12/31/93 9/28/01 1966-01 0  
Namibia (BB) 11/28/97 9/28/01 1990-01 3  
Netherlands (BB) 1/31/83 9/28/01     1977-01 1
New Zealand (BB) 1/29/60 9/28/01 1966-83 2 1984-01 3
Norway (KS) 1/1/75 5/31/99 1966-87 1 1988-01 1
Pakistan (BB) 1/31/89 9/28/01 1966-94 0 1995-01 4
Panama (BB) 12/31/92 9/28/01     1966-01 0
Peru (BB) 12/31/92 9/28/01     1993-01 3
Philippines (KS) 12/1/84 5/31/99 1969-94 2 1966-68, 95-01 2
Poland (BB) 4/30/91 9/28/01 1986-97 3 1998-01 1
Portugal (KS) 1/1/86 4/30/99 1966-92 3 1993-01 0
Russia (BB) 6/30/94 9/28/01 1992-95 1 1996-01 7
Saudi Arabia (BB) 1/31/94 9/28/01   1966-01 0
Singapore (BB) 1/31/85 9/28/01 1966-77   1978-01 4
South Africa (BB) 4/29/88 9/28/01 1966-01 2  
Spain (KS) 1/1/75 12/31/98 1966-93 4 1994-01 0
Sweden (KS) 1/1/75 5/31/99 1966-92 2 1993-01 0
Switzerland (BB) 7/31/89 9/28/01   1992-01 0
Taiwan (BB) 1/31/67 9/28/01 1966-86 3 1987-01 9
Thailand (KS) 12/1/75 5/31/99 1966-91 2 1992-01 7
Turkey (BB) 2/28/92 9/28/01 1966-89 0 1990-01 8
UK (KS) 1/1/75 4/30/99 1966-78 0 1979-01 0
US (BB) 1/29/60 9/28/01   1966-01 1
Venezuela (KS) 12/1/84 5/31/99 1984-89 3 1966-83, 90-01 8
Zimbabwe (BB) 9/30/96 9/28/01 1980-01 2  
The source is indicated in parenthesis (KS:Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2001 or BB: Bloomberg)
Figure 8:
28have to imply that for some parameters, a decrease in q is possible. As ∂q/∂φ > 0 a l w a y s ,t h i si sn o t
possible.
Appendix IV: Asymmetric equilibria in the emerging market
Suppose only a portion lE < 1 of the L agents in the emerging market invest. The stock market
equilibrium relation as well as the income relation can easily be rewritten accordingly and it can be
checked that world income is the same as in the text. For 0 <l E < 1, the pro￿to fi n v e s t i n gm u s t
be zero, or using the the constant world income equation: lE + q−2 =
β(wE+wI)
F(2+β) . The intuition is
that an increase in the relative price of assets in the emerging market induces entry which in this case
implies a rise in the proportion of agents who invest. It proves convenient to rewrite the ￿xed cost
as F = αF1with F1 =
βwE
2+β .W et h e ng e tlE + q−2 = 1
αsw.Am o d i ￿ed YY curve is derived from the
de￿nition of aggregate income in the emerging economy: L(wE+ 1
2lEp2
E) and the zero pro￿t condition.
This de￿nes sY the share of aggregate income in the emerging market as an increasing function of q:
sY =





(1 − αswq−2) (A4)
Am o d i ￿ed qq curve is derived from the stock market equilibrium:
sY =
¡
q2 − αsw + swφq1/ρ¢¡
1 − φq−1/ρ¢




with lE de￿ned by the zero pro￿t condition. It can be shown that such an equilibrium for which 0
<l E < 1 never exists if α < 1. This implies that only the equilibrium with all agents investing exists.
An example where an asymmetric equilibrium exists is in the autarky situation (φ =0 )i fα > 1.I n
this case, a symmetric equilibrium with lE =1cannot be an equilibrium as it would involve negative
pro￿ts. It can be shown easily that lE =1 /α < 1.I n c a s e s w i t h φ > 0, asymmetric equilibria can
exist if α is suﬃciently larger than one. From (A4) and (A5), it can be checked that the modi￿ed YY
and qq curves are similar to those depicted in ￿gure 5 and cross only once. In particular, a decrease
in transaction costs has a similar impact whereas all or only a portion of agents invest. The new qq
curve shifts to the right as in ￿gure 5 so that both q and sY rise. The intuition is the same as in
the text but now a new variable ajusts: lE, the portion of agents who invest. As transaction costs
decrease, this portion increases in the emerging market and the price of assets in the industrialized
country decrease so q increases. When the level of transaction costs is low enough, all agents in the
emerging market invest and we are back to the case analysed in the main text. Hence, the asymmetric
equilibria are not qualitatively diﬀerent from the symmetric ones.
Appendix V: Asymmetric transaction costs







W ec a ns i g nt h i se x p r e s s i o nb yt h er e s t r i c t i o nt h a tsY < 1.
29Appendix VI: A more general investment cost function
Suppose that the cost function is: f(zE)= 1
mzm
E with m>1, so that we retain the convexity
property of the cost function. In this case, the YY schedule becomes:
sY =




m(1 + β)(1 + q−m/(m−1))
(A7)









It remains true that q<1 in equilibrium as long as wE <w I. The working of ￿gure 4 remains
similar. If m ≥ 2/(2−ρ), then the qualitative result of ￿gure 4 is unchanged: a symmetric decrease of
transaction costs generates an increase in asset prices and income in the emerging market. A suﬃcient
condition is that m ≥ 2. However, if m<2/(2− ρ) and transaction costs are high enough (φ is low),
then a symmetric decrease in transaction costs can lead to a decrease in asset price and income in the
emerging market. At some point however the lower transaction costs lead to increase in asset prices
and income. The reason for this result is that the slope of the qq is also altered by a change in φ.
The eﬀect of an increase in φ on the qq curve can be analyzed by looking at how sY is aﬀected by an













This can be positive (implying an upward shift of the qq curve) for m<2/(2−ρ), large diﬀerences
in productivities and high transaction costs. This case is shown on ￿gure 9.
Hence, when the cost function is not very convex, ￿nancial globalization can in a ￿rst phase decrease
asset prices and income in the emerging market especially if its productivity level is low. In this case,
it also leads in a ￿rst phase to a current account surplus in the emerging market. The intuition is
that in this case (which can also be interpreted as high risk aversion case) the diversi￿cation purpose
is strong relative to the arbitrage one: this implies that agents in the industrialized country will not
exploit much the diﬀerence in price between markets when transaction costs go down (at least for
high transaction costs) but agents in the emerging market will want to diversify and buy assets in the
industrialized country.
The analysis of the possibility of a crash driven by self-ful￿lling expectations is more complex but
not fundamentally altered in the case of a more general cost function as long as it is convex. It implies
￿nding parameter values for which the investment is zero if agents expect zero investment and positive












Figure 9: Lower transaction costs: the case of weak convexity and high transaction cost
Appendix VII: The impact of diﬀerent population size
Because we want to focus on the consequences of lower productivity and wage in emerging market
compared to industrialized countries, we have not allowed for diﬀerent population size between the two
countries. Doing this has potentially important consequences because of two features in our model:
t h em a r k e ts i z ee ﬀect and the fact that a larger population implies a larger number of projects/assets.
Hence both demand and supply of assets are aﬀected. To see this suppose now that wages are identical
in the two countries but that populations (rather than being equal as in the paper) are LE and LI






2(1 + β)(LE + LIq−2)
(A10)
where sY = LEYE/(LEYE + LIYI) is now the share of the E country in aggregate world income.









The equilibrium is graphed on ￿gure 10 where we assumed that LE <L I :
It can be shown that the equilibrium relative price when φ < 1 is less than 1. Hence, imperfect
integration of ￿nancial markets implies lower asset prices in the small country. From this point of
view the eﬀect resembles a lot the market size eﬀect when wages diﬀe r . A ni n c r e a s ei np o p u l a t i o n
size has however an ambiguous eﬀect. As shown on ￿gure 10 both the YY and qq curves are aﬀected.
This is because both demand and supply of assets are increased. It can be shown that for low levels












Figure 10: An increase population size of E: the case where asset prices in E decrease
in q. For high levels of φ (low levels of transaction costs), the demand eﬀect dominates so that an
increase in LE implies an increase in q.
It can be shown that at φ =0and φ =1 , asset prices are identical (q =1 )i nt h et w oc o u n t r i e s
(again as long as wage rates are identical) even if population diﬀer. At φ =1 , perfect capital mobility,
the reason is again perfect arbitrage. At φ =0 , ￿nancial autarky, this is because the demand and
the supply eﬀect of population size cancel each other. A small population implies a lower demand for
assets but also implies a small number of assets. Given this, it can be shown that the relative price of
assets q is U-shaped as a function of φ when wages are equal and LE <LI.
It can be checked that in the case of pessimistic expectations the expected pro￿t function in the
"pessimistic" country is U-shaped as in ￿gure 5. Equation (18) in the text is still valid but with
sw = LEwE/(LEwE + LIwI). It can then be shown that the expected "pessimistic" pro￿t function
of the smaller country (in terms of non capital aggregate income) is always below the one of the
larger country. The reason the ambiguous eﬀect of large population on asset prices that applies in the
optimistic case does not apply when we analyse the vulnerability of crashes is a particular assumption
in our model. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the economy in the ￿rst period starts with zero
zero capital stock or zero projects. Suppose however that agents are endowed with projects. If the
aggregate endowment of projects depends positively on population size, a reasonnable assumption,
and as projects/assets are substitutes, larger population size would increase the supply of assets and
have a negative impact on asset prices in the crash equilibrium. The positive demand eﬀect of larger
population would still play a role so that the eﬀect of population size on ￿nancial vulnerability would
be ambiguous as it is on asset prices in the optimistic equilibrium.
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